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Abstract 
 
We present a theoretical framework and supporting empirical evidence for the choice of acquisition 
method in takeovers. In our model, bidders have a preference for speedy execution in order to minimize 
competition for the target. Due to existing regulations, tender offers provide substantially lower 
completion times than mergers and, as a result, are the acquisition method of choice. However, a tender 
offer signals to the target good market opportunities for its shares which raises its reservation price. In 
equilibrium, bidders trade-off speed and costs: tenders are faster but have higher premiums. We show that 
deals in more competitive environments and deals with lesser external impediments on execution are 
more likely to be structured as tender offers. Furthermore, the rivals of the bidding firm exhibit 
significantly lower announcement returns in tender offers than in mergers.  
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“Still, little is known about why we sometimes observe takeover by … tender offer and 
sometimes by merger.” – Harris and Raviv (1988) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the United States, there are essentially two ways to acquire the cash flow rights to a publicly 
traded firm, either through a merger or through a tender offer.1  In a merger, the acquirer and the 
target’s board of directors agree on a price, and then the target’s shareholders vote to approve the 
deal. In a tender offer, the acquirer proposes a per-share price to the target’s shareholders, and 
then the shareholders have the choice to sell their shares at the offer price or keep them.  Harris 
and Raviv were perplexed about how acquirers choose between these two acquisitions methods.  
Twenty five years later, there is still no well-established theory about the choice of takeover 
method. 
 In the interim, the nature of tender offers changed.  Historically, a tender offer was a 
hostile takeover device, used to bypass an unwilling board of directors.  The introduction of the 
Best Price Rule in the late 1980s by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made 
tender offers fairer, assuring that blockholders could not be bought out for a higher price than 
other investors.2  Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that the adoption of state antitakeover 
laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s almost eradicated hostile tender offers completely. 
Revisions to the Best Price Rule in 2006 opened the market for friendly tender offers like never 
before.  Our data shows that tenders are now as friendly as mergers.  Despite the end of hostility, 
tender offers are still a common acquisition method. 
                                                          
1 A tender offer in which the acquirer offers shares of its stock as part or complete consideration in the deal is legally 
known as an exchange offer, but follows very similar rules to a tender offer.  For our purposes, we lump tender 
offers and exchange offers into one unless we explicitly state otherwise. 
2 The Best Price Rule is also known as SEC Rule 14d-10. 
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 In this paper, we propose a new theory for the choice of acquisition method which is 
generally supported by the data.  The key difference between mergers and tender offer is in the 
completion speed.  The regulations are designed to allow for faster completion of tender offers 
than mergers.  Given that tender offers are quicker to complete, the speed must come at cost, 
otherwise all deals would be tenders.  In our theory, acquirers trade-off speed and cost: tenders 
are faster, but come with a higher premium. 
The first half of the paper develops a simple model which elaborates on the tradeoff 
outlined above. Our model predicts that an acquirer will prefer a tender offer as the acquisition 
method when there is high expected competition for the target, and may use a tender when there 
is no competition if the costs of waiting are sufficiently high. We also show that takeover premia 
will be higher in tender offers than in mergers.   
In the second half of the paper, we present empirical evidence consistent with our 
theoretical predictions based on a unique dataset with hand-collected data on acquisitions 
announced between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.3 We show that the completion time 
of tender offers is from 35 to 65 days shorter than the completion time of mergers conditional on 
the model used. Next, we find that the probability for a bidder to structure the deal as a tender 
offer increases with measures of the competitiveness of the takeover market. In particular, a 
bidder is more likely to pursue the target via tender offer if there is an outstanding bid for the 
target from another firm. Bidders are also more likely to choose a tender when they have some 
prior relationship with the target because, in this case, losing the target to a competitor would be 
more costly. Next, we find that target-initiated deals are less likely to be structured as tender 
                                                          
3 We focus on the post-2006 period since the revision of the Best Price Rule in 2006 relaxed significantly some of 
the regulatory constraints on tender offers (see Section 5).  
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offers. Finally, we show that the announcement returns of the bidder rivals are negative and 
significantly lower for tender offers than for mergers.  
We also find that bidders are less likely to pursue a tender offer when the legal and 
financial costs of the tender are higher. Acquisition attempts that experience additional scrutiny 
from governmental agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) take 114 days longer to complete. Such deals are rarely structured as tender 
offers. Given that the level of government scrutiny is relatively easy to predict, our theory 
suggests that a rational bidder would avoid incurring the extra costs of tender offers without 
getting the execution benefits. Next, we find that tender offers are less likely for bidders with 
higher leverage ratios and less cash; a result consistent with the idea that tender offers present 
less financial flexibility to the bidder than mergers. Finally, we show that controlling for the 
endogeneity of the deal structure, tenders are more expensive than mergers.  
The existing literature identifies two key differences between mergers and tenders.  First, 
Betton et al. (2008) indicate that tenders for publicly-traded firms are faster than mergers.  
Second, many articles have shown that the takeover premiums in tender offers are higher than in 
mergers (Schwert, 1996; Officer, 2003; Moeller et al. (2004)).4  The major contribution of our 
paper is that it shows why these relationships exist and how they are tied together via the trade-
off for the acquirer between speed and cost.  
Our paper makes several other meaningful contributions. In particular, the insight that 
bidder competition for the target is a key factor in the choice of acquisition method leads us to 
the conclusion that the choice of method reveals new information about the two firms. For the 
target, the choice of method signals new information about its synergies with the acquirer and the 
                                                          
4 However, other papers find no difference in the premiums between tenders and mergers (Huang and Walkling, 
1987; Betton et al., 2008). 
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market for its shares.  For the bidder, the choice of method also signals new information about its 
competitive interactions with other firms in the market, financial health, and likelihood for 
regulatory scrutiny.  
We also contribute to a better understanding of the nature of tender offers.  Currently, top 
M&A textbooks, including Bruner (2004) and DePamphilis (2011), do not explicitly address 
how firms choose the method of the deal. In many empirical studies, the authors use a tender 
offer dummy to proxy for the differences between tenders and mergers, without describing what 
those differences are. Historically, there has also been an assumption in the finance literature that 
tender offers are hostile.5 As Andrade et al. (2001) document, hostile tender offers almost 
completely disappeared after the 1980s, yet tender offers did not disappear. Furthermore, 
Schwert (2000) argues that that most deals described as hostile in the press are not 
distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms. In our sample time period, friendly 
tenders represent 99% of all tender offers. In all friendly cases, the tender offer price is 
negotiated with the target’s board, in concert with its financial and legal advisors. Friendly tender 
offers are the norm now, not the exception. Our research gives more guidance to financial and 
legal scholars who wish to differentiate between the two methods of acquisitions. 
 In the next section, we offer a legal, regulatory, and empirical background on the choice 
between tender and merger.  In Section 3, we construct a model that incorporates the trade-off 
between speed and cost; in Section 4, derive testable applications; in Section, 5 we discuss the 
sample; while in Section 6, we present the empirical analysis. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
                                                          
5 There are some exceptions. For example, Comment and Jarrell (1987) note that tender offers can also involve prior 
pre-announcement negotiations.  
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2. Background 
 In this section we review the legal and regulatory environment of the acquisition market. 
We place special attention on the speed of execution from both regulatory and strategic 
perspective.  At the end of the section, we review the existing academic literature on tender 
offers. 
 
2.1 Acquisition method and the speed of execution 
 Our focus in this study is on the time from the announcement of the deal to the 
completion of the deal.  Prior to the announcement, the bidder and target negotiate in private for 
weeks or months.  These negotiations are unknown to market participants, including the bidder’s 
rivals. At the announcement of the agreement, new information is released to the market about 
the value of the target.  A bidding competitor has the opportunity to outbid its rival in the 
window of time from announcement to completion, so that is the time period that is valuable in 
our model. 
There are three regulatory reasons that cash tender offers in the United States should be 
faster from announcement to completion than mergers. First, the SEC has different filing 
requirements for tenders and mergers.  The only filing required to initiate a tender is the tender 
offer statement (SC-TO).  The SC-TO is filed on the same day that the tender offer begins. 
Under SEC Rule 14d-1, the tender offer may end as soon as 20 calendar days after the initial 
filing. The target shareholders do not vote in a cash tender offer, but they do in a merger, and a 
shareholder vote takes time. In order to have a shareholder vote to approve a merger, SEC Rule 
14d-6 requires the bidder to first file a preliminary proxy (PREM14a) with the SEC at least 10 
days before distributing the definitive proxy to the shareholders (DEFM14a). Then, the target 
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firm must distribute the definitive proxy statement to its shareholders announcing the meeting at 
least 20 business days before the vote will occur.  As a result, there is typically a two-month 
lead-up to a shareholder vote in a merger.   
Another regulatory difference in the U.S. between tenders and mergers is in the antitrust 
review. The FTC and DOJ have 30 days to review a merger or exchange offer for antitrust 
concerns under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, but only have 15 days for a cash tender offer. If either 
agency requests additional information from the parties (known as a “second request”), the time 
to complete the deal increases. Kirchner (2009) finds that it takes 157 days to resolve the average 
second request. If the acquirer believes that a second request is likely, it will not rationally incur 
the additional costs of a tender offer.6  
Finally, mergers and tenders differ in their financing requirements.  SEC Rule 14e-1(c) 
requires the bidder to pay for tendered shares or return them to the shareholder within three days 
of the close of the tender offer.7   SEC Rule 14e-8(c) deems a tender offer to be fraudulent if the 
bidder does not have a reasonable belief that it can purchase the securities sought.8  Neither rule 
explicitly requires tenders to be fully financed, but an acquirer would be exposing itself to 
significant liability by commencing an offer without the means to pay for the shares.  Practically 
speaking, tender offers must be fully financed in order to meet the three-day requirement. In 
contrast, merger agreements are often conditioned upon the acquirer securing financing. 
Depending on market conditions, financing a merger can take months.  Furthermore, if the 
                                                          
6 Once the second request is fulfilled, the agency will have an additional 30 day extension to complete its review for 
mergers, but only ten days for tenders.  
7 This rule, otherwise known as the “Prompt Payment Requirement,” only requires payment to be made “promptly,” 
but does not define promptly.  However, the SEC staff has interpreted promptly to mean three days.  See Lynn 
(2009). 
8 In Release No. 33-7760, the SEC notes that, “Although not required, a commitment letter or other evidence of 
financing ability (e.g., funds on hand or an existing credit facility) would in most cases be adequate to satisfy the 
rule's requirement that the bidder have a reasonable belief that it can purchase the securities sought.”  The SEC also 
comments that, “In most cases when the bidder expects to obtain funds from another source, financing is arranged in 
advance or immediately after announcing an offer.” 
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acquirer is using a sizable amount of its own stock as consideration in the deal, then it may also 
be required to hold a time-consuming shareholder vote to approve the merger. Given these three 
regulatory differences, we expect that tender offers should be faster than mergers.  
 
2.2 Speed of execution as a consideration in acquisitions 
 The evidence thus far suggests that tender offers have a substantially shorter completion 
time than mergers. Execution speed could be an important consideration in the acquisition 
market for a variety of reasons. Theory of decision making argues that early resolution of 
uncertainty generally allows for better allocation of resources. Mergers represent a dramatic 
shock to every organization, and the uncertainty surrounding the merger outcome could 
adversely affect all stakeholders associated with the firm, such as customers, suppliers, and 
employees, resulting in the erosion of value. For example, in response to the Oracle tender offer 
in June of 2003, PeopleSoft warns, “As a consequence of the uncertainty surrounding their roles 
and the companies' future, our key employees…may seek other employment opportunities.”9 
Consistent with this idea, Hertzel et al. (2008) also find that firm uncertainty regarding financial 
distress exhibits adverse effect on its suppliers.    
 A major incentive for the timely completion of takeovers arises from bidder competition. 
Extensive research suggests that mergers could be an important factor in the creation and 
sustainability of competitive advantage (Trautwein, 1990). Some of the sources of competitive 
advantage in mergers are synergies, others – economies of scope and scale (Betton et al. 2008). 
Horizontal mergers could also strengthen market power, while vertical mergers could reduce 
‘hold-up’ production costs (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988). Many authors 
                                                          
9 PeopleSoft S-4, filed June 19, 2003. 
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have also emphasized the importance of complementarities at the level of organizational culture 
as a source of competitive advantage in acquisitions (Porter, 1987; Datta, 1991).  
 The merger market is highly competitive – in our sample, 39.7 percent of all deals are 
contested. First movers could gain a long-term competitive advantage in modern markets. As a 
result, the speedy execution of a merger could minimize the chance that a competitive bidder 
“steals” the target or raises its price. Many authors have also suggested that pressured by 
competition, firms often over-bid for a target, a phenomenon known as the “winner’s curse” 
(Gilberto et al. 1989).  
There is also anecdotal evidence that the different speed of execution across tender offers 
and mergers is well recognized and considered by the market. Several companies acknowledge 
in their SEC filings that the use of a tender offer will help the deal reach conclusion faster.  For 
instance, in the 2007 tender offer for Biosite Inc. by Inverness Medical Innovations Inc., the 
background of the Offer to Purchase stated “Biosite’s advisors indicated on multiple occasions 
Biosite’s board of directors’ strong preference for a two-step tender offer structure, which would 
take a shorter period of time to deliver the consideration to Biosite’s shareholders that elected to 
tender in the tender offer than would a one-step merger structure.”10 Many well-publicized deals 
were also very likely structured as mergers rather than tender offers due to a perceived lack of 
competitiveness – for example, the AT&T/T-Mobile deal (Verizon was too big and Sprint was 
having financial difficulties) or the Delta/Northwest merger (United and Continental were busy 
with their own merger and American was too big).    
In our subsequent analysis, we will test whether tenders are in fact faster than mergers 
and attempt to determine why some firms choose not to take advantage of that speed.  
 
                                                          
10 See page 29 of Exhibit 99.(A)(1)(A) to the Schedule TO-T filed by Inverness with the SEC on 5/29/2007. 
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2.3 Related literature 
 To the best of our knowledge, there are only two theoretical studies that attempt to 
explain the choice of the takeover mechanism. Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) model mergers as 
a bargaining game between the acquiring and target firms and tender offers as an auction in 
which bidders arrive sequentially and compete for the target. A basic assumption of their model 
is that once mergers are announced, there is no possibility for competitive bids, which is 
increasingly violated in recent times. Schnitzer (1996) analyzes the choice between a hostile and 
a friendly takeover. Our study is different because it focuses on the choice between mergers and 
tender offers and explores a different trade-off in the market place.  
The empirical work in this field has identified mathematical correlations, but does not 
rigorously explain why these correlations exist. The seminal work of Bradley et al. (1983) 
indicates that tenders create value by generating new information about the target in the takeover 
process. However, their methods and results are equally applicable to mergers, so their findings 
do not point acquirers to one particular takeover method.  Betton et al. (2008) acknowledge that, 
“systematic empirical evidence on the choice of merger versus tender offer is only beginning to 
emerge.”   
That said, the empirical literature does identify some important differences between 
tender offers and mergers. First, Betton et al. (2008) find that the average tender offer for a 
publicly-traded target by a publicly-traded acquirer is completed about 36 days faster than a 
similar merger.  The legal structure that we documented previously suggests that tenders should 
be faster, and the evidence in Betton et al. supports this notion. Second, Betton et al. (2009) find 
that tenders are more likely to be completed than mergers. If the primary cost of a merger over a 
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tender offer is the cost of losing the target, then their finding suggests that this cost is indeed 
lower in tenders.  
Empirical research also suggests that tender offers are more expensive than mergers but 
the evidence is not robust. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that target shareholders 
earn higher premiums in tenders than in mergers. However, Huang and Walkling (1987) argue 
that after controlling for the payment method and the degree of resistance, the difference in 
abnormal returns between tender offers and mergers is insignificant. We note that the literature 
usually does not address the endogeneity of the acquisition form, which could significantly affect 
the inferences. However, predicting the choice of acquisition form requires a theoretical 
framework suggesting what the predictors might be.  
 
3. A Simple Model 
 The background review in the previous section reveals that tender offers should be faster 
than mergers, but at a cost.  Real option theory has for long recognized that waiting (or the speed 
of execution of an action) could have costs and benefits for the actor. Within the context of 
corporate acquisitions, if the costs of waiting outweigh the benefits, the deal will be structured as 
a tender offer and vice versa – if the costs of waiting are relatively small compared to the 
benefits, the deal will be structured as a merger.  
The cost of waiting for the bidder that we are concerned with is the cost of failing to gain 
control of the target, through the acquisition of the target by another entity. In this case, the 
bidder bears a cost because it does not capture the synergy gains. Furthermore, the fact that the 
target is acquired by a competitor could result in loss of a competitive advantage.   
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Similarly, there are costs to the target in not waiting. The most obvious cost is the 
forgone option to shop for a better deal.  In order to forgo this real option, the target must be 
compensated. The target is effectively selling its go-shop option to the bidder in exchange for a 
higher premium, which becomes the bidder’s cost of not waiting.  In our model that follows, we 
evaluate the trade-off between the costs of waiting and the costs of not waiting, with an eye on 
the empirical predictions that the model generates. 
Suppose the value of the target shares for a potential bidder (acquirer) is Bv , while the 
value of the target shares for the target shareholders is sv . As Grossman and Hart (1980) argue, 
the transaction will take place only when sB vv  . The value sv could be interpreted as a 
reservation price for the target shareholders. As long as the offer-price exceeds that reservation 
value, the deal would be completed.  
While the bidder is at an informational advantage in evaluating the synergies associated 
with the acquisition, the target is not. There are two possibilities for the target regarding a 
particular acquisition. On the one hand, the synergy created by the deal could be unique to the 
particular bidder. For example, it could reflect some unique complementarity of the asset 
structure of the bidder and the assets of the target. In this case, the assets of the target have no 
superior alternative use outside of the ownership of the bidder.  On the other hand, the synergies 
that the target firm brings might not be that unique to the bidder and other firms could potentially 
be able to generate even higher surplus with the acquisition of the firm. The latter possibility 
raises the reservation price of the target firm. We can assume that the private valuation of the 
target firm for the value of its shares under alternative ownership could take two possible values 
L
sv and 
H
sv  (
H
s
L
s vv  ). The first valuation corresponds to the reservation price for the target 
shareholders in the case in which there is no other bidder in the market; the second valuation 
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corresponds to the existence of an alternative bidder with a higher private valuation of the target 
shares.  
 We consider the following timeline. At t = 0, the bidder (with a private valuation Bv ) 
discovers the target and observes whether there is an alternative potential bidder with higher 
private valuation ( B
H vv  ). At t = 1, the acquirer announces a takeover bid which could be 
structured either as a tender offer or a merger. The tender offer has a shorter expected completion 
time and assures that the competing firm would not be able to join the bidding contest and outbid 
the acquirer.11 The merger has longer completion time, which results in an additional erosion of 
value for the bidder in the amount c (we describe some of these costs in Section 3).  However, in 
the case of merger, if there is a competing bidder in the market place with higher valuation it 
enters the contest and the acquirer loses the target to the competing firm. The latter outcome 
results in some permanent loss of value for the bidder due to loss in competitive advantage or 
relative market shareC . At t = 2, the target firm arrives at a private valuation of its reservation 
price and the deal takes place.  
 Assume that the acquirer receives p percent of the surplus created by the acquisition 
(such that p > 0), and the target receives the remaining 1 - p percent of the surplus. Then the gain 
to the bidder under the different scenarios could be expressed as follows:  
 
                                                          
11 In reality, a tender offer would only reduce the probability that the bidder could lose the target to a competitor and 
not necessarily completely eliminate this possibility. This simplifying assumption, however, does not affect 
significantly the major inferences in the paper.  
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 No competition Competition 
Tender offer )( SB vvp   )( SB vvp   
Merger cpvvp SB  )(  C  
 
 From here, it becomes clear that in the presence of a competitive bidder the acquirer 
would never choose to structure the deal as a merger given that, in this case, it will suffer 
permanent loss in value. As a result, the announcement of a merger would automatically signal 
to the target poor market opportunities for its assets and the target would revise its reservation 
price to Lsv . In this case, the gain for the bidder would be )( cvvp
L
SB   and the gain for the 
target would be )()1( cvvp LSB  .  
 Let’s consider the more interesting case of no competitive bidders in the market place. 
Although the acquirer might be able to evaluate this possibility reliably well, it is potentially very 
difficult to communicate this information reliably to the target. If the acquirer chooses to 
structure the deal as a tender offer, the target would update its reservation price to HSv ; if the 
acquirer chooses to structure the deal as a merger, the target would update its reservation price 
to LSv . In the case of no competitive bidding, the deal would be structured as a tender offer only if 
cpvvpvvp LSB
H
SB  )()(      (1) 
From here it follows that under no competition, the deal will be structured as a tender 
offer only when: 
L
S
H
S vvc          (2) 
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The above result is intuitive. It says that under no competition, a deal would be structured 
as a tender offer only when the cost of waiting associated with a merger is relatively high 
compared to the value loss due to increase in the takeover premium. An important assumption in 
this line of reasoning is that the acquirer cannot signal reliably to the target the lack of alternative 
outside options for its assets in the market. 
 Note also that our model also generates the following relationship between the price of 
the target in a tender offer and the price in a merger: 
M
L
SB
L
S
H
SB
H
STO PcpvvpvvvpvP  )1()()1()()1(  (3) 
Regardless of whether there is competition, our model predicts that the premium will be always 
higher in a tender than in a merger.  
 Our model relies on the assumption that the acquirer loses a value C when the target is 
merged with a competitor. This corresponds to the loss that Bradley et al. (1983) observe when a 
tender offer bid is lost to a rival firm. As a result of the rival getting control of the target, the 
bidder not only loses the target, but they also lose the competitive advantage that the rival wins 
by gaining control of the rival’s assets.  
In summary, our model predicts that an acquirer will always use a tender offer as the 
acquisition method when there is competition for the target, and may use a tender when there is 
no competition if the costs of waiting are sufficiently high. Also, our model predicts that 
premiums will be higher in tender offers than in mergers. Finally, the model implies that returns 
to rival acquirers should be lower in tenders than in mergers. All of these predictions assume that 
the deal can legally or practically be structured as a tender offer. 
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4. Empirical Design 
We argue that when choosing their acquisition method firms trade-off the strategic 
benefits of speed with the cost of a higher premium. The starting point of our analysis is the 
assumption that tender offers have shorter completion times than mergers. In the previous 
section, we presented legal and regulatory arguments for this assumption.12 However, empirical 
evidence is necessary to confirm this conjecture. Thus, our first empirical test is on:  
Hypothesis 1. Tender offers have shorter completion times than mergers.  
Our major empirical prediction regarding the choice of acquisition method is outlined in 
the following:  
Hypothesis 2. Firms with significant competitive threats and other costs of waiting 
choose tender offers.  
We consider three proxies for competitiveness – indicators for a competitive bidder, 
solicited deal, and prior relationship. Evaluating the competitive environment of a bidder ex-
ante is highly speculative. As a result, we construct an ex-post measure of competitiveness 
indicating whether there was a competitive bid for the target prior to the announcement.13 Such a 
bid would generally decrease the amount of time the acquirer has to close the deal. In this case, 
the choice of a slower acquisition method would significantly reduce the chances of acquiring 
the target.   
Next, we identify whether the bid was solicited by the target. Target-initiated deals are 
less likely to exhibit synergies that are strategically important to a large group of bidders. 
                                                          
12 Completion time is the time from the first official announcement of the bid to the final approval of the deal. It 
does not include the time of any private negotiations between the two parties since such negotiations are not public 
information.  
13 We learn this information by reading the background of the deal in the DEFM14a for mergers and the SC TO-t or 
S-4 in tenders. Bids are classified as competitive if the acquirer had to raise its bid or make a counter-offer to beat 
another bidder.  The identity of the other bidder is almost never disclosed in the filings. 
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Otherwise, these synergies would have been discovered by the market. Soliciting firms are 
seemingly rushing to sell themselves for some idiosyncratic reasons. Therefore, we expect 
solicited deals to be less likely to be structured as tender offers. Our indicator variable for 
solicited deals takes the value of one if the acquirer’s bid was the result of a formal solicitation 
process, and zero otherwise (we obtain this information from SEC filings).  
 Our third measure of the competitive environment of the bidder is a variable indicating 
whether the bidder and the target disclose some prior relationship in their filings. That prior 
relationship may be a licensing agreement, joint venture, or a simple customer/supplier 
connection.14 Joint history implies that very likely some relationship-specific investment has 
been made on the bidder-side. Such investment makes a competitive threat potentially more 
costly to the firm. As a result, we predict that deals involving firms with prior relationship are 
more likely to be tender offers.  
 We also consider a set of variables proxing for other (non-competitive) costs of waiting – 
a second request dummy, acquirer high debt dummy, cash offer dummy, and deal relative value. 
Our sample includes deals in which the FTC, DOJ, or other governmental agency created a delay 
in the closing via a second request or similar extended review.15 The firms in an acquisition often 
hire specialized attorneys specifically to help clear the governmental hurdles, and these lawyers 
presumably know whether a deal is likely to be slowed by a second request.16 Therefore, we 
hypothesize that firms will choose a merger over a tender if there is a high probability of a 
                                                          
14 Disclosure in the proxy or offer statement of past transactions is required by Item 1005 of Regulation M-A.  We 
also learn this information by reading the background of the deal in the SEC filings.   
15 We also find deals that experienced lengthy reviews by the Federal Aviation Adminsitration (FAA), Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), Surface Transportation Board (STB), and various state agencies. 
16 For example, in the Background of the Merger between XM and Sirius, the parties note that, “SIRIUS and XM 
agreed to discuss with their respective counsel the likelihood of obtaining the required regulatory approvals for a 
combination.” It goes on to identify two specific law firms that were competent in this area, one for the DOJ/FTC 
approval and another for the FCC approval.  See page 20 of the DEFM14A filed by XM Satellite Holdings with the 
SEC on 10/9/2007. 
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second request. The acquirer high debt dummy, cash offer dummy and relative value proxy for 
the ability of the bidder to make a fully-financed offer. We expect that the greater the financing 
impediments to a takeover, the more likely it is that it will be organized as a merger.  
A major prediction of our model is that the premium under tender offers would always 
exceed the premium under mergers (for the same companies). Unfortunately, we cannot observe 
a deal which is simultaneously structured as both – a tender offer and a merger. Companies 
always choose one (the optimal) option guided by a wide range of factors some of which could 
be correlated with the expected premium. The endogeneity of the deal structure makes it difficult 
to make direct empirical predictions about the association between the deal structure and the 
premium in the cross section. One way to address this problem is to identify instrumental 
variables that predict the acquisition method but not the expected premium and use these 
variables to isolate the exogenous variation in acquisition method choice. Hypothesis 2 suggests 
a large set of potential instruments.  As a result, we predict the following:  
Hypothesis 3. In the cross-section of deals, the instrumented tender offer-indicator is 
positively correlated with the acquisition premium.  
 Finally, if strategic considerations are an important motivation for bidders to demand 
execution speed we would expect tender offers to be associated with more strategically important 
acquisitions. As a result, we predict the following 
Hypothesis 4. Tender offers are accompanied with lower announcement returns for the 
rivals of the bidding firm than mergers.  
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5. Data and Summary Statistics 
This study focuses on the post-2006 period because the revision of the SEC’s Best Price 
Rule in 2006 reduced the tremendous legal uncertainty in the tender offer market. The original 
Best Price Rule specified that all investors holding the same class of securities had to be paid the 
same consideration per share in a tender offer. However, the wording of the rule was not clear 
about whether executive compensation triggered by the tender offer was included in the 
definition of “consideration,” so it was left to the courts to decide. A series of conflicting rulings 
by the 2nd, 7th, and 9th U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals (during the 1995–2002 period) about the 
applicability of executive compensation to the definition of consideration created some 
additional uncertainty about the acquisition costs of tender offers. As a result, the Best Price Rule 
was amended effective December 8, 2006 to require that compensation payments be excluded 
from the definition of consideration. A more detailed history of the Best Price Rule is presented 
in Appendix 2.  Figure 1 shows the significant drop-off in tender offers from 2002 to 2006, and 
the rebound after the revision of the Best Price Rule in 2006. 
Therefore, we form a sample of U.S.-based targets taken over by U.S.-based acquirers in 
deals announced between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010 from the Thomson Financial 
SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. We require all of the targets in our sample to 
be based in the United States so that U.S. takeover law applies to the deal. We require all 
acquirers to meet the same criteria to avoid complications arising from differing foreign tax and 
legal regimes. We require all deals to be completed so that we can accurately measure time to 
completion. The time-to-completion is measured from the day the deal is announced to the day 
the deal is effective.   
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Given that large part of the data is hand-collected, we limit our sample to deals in which 
the acquirer holds more than 90% of the target’s equity. A tender offer is most beneficial to the 
acquirer when at least 90% of the target’s existing common stock is tendered.17 We also require 
all firms in our sample, targets and acquirers, to be listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or American 
Stock Exchange. Consistent with the literature, we also remove from our sample all deals in the 
heavily regulated financial and utilities industries.  Our final sample consists of 213 mergers and 
95 tender offers, for a total sample of 308 completed deals.  In comparison, the sample in 
Hartzell et al. (2004) is 235 firms and Boone and Mulherin (2007) end up with 400 observations. 
For each deal, we calculate the takeover premium as the offer price less the stock price 
four weeks prior to the announcement date, divided by the price four weeks prior.  For 
robustness, we also calculate the premiums with two-month returns, rather than four-week 
returns.  In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the sample of mergers and tender offers 
over the period from 2007-2010. We observe that tender offers are characterized with 
significantly higher premiums and shorter completion times. We also show that about 38% of 
tenders have competitive bidders, but only 14% of mergers.  Parties with prior relationships are 
far more likely to structure the deal as a tender than a merger.  Deals that will be delayed by a 
second request are also more likely to be structured as mergers. Collectively, these results 
suggest that the choice of method is likely to be tender offer when time is of the essence.   
The SEC rule that the financing must be secured before the tender offer commences also 
seems to affect the choice of method in three ways.  First, as also noted by Travlos (1987), 
tenders are far more likely to be financed with cash than with equity.  Second, targets of tenders 
                                                          
17 In 48 of the 50 states, if an acquirer ends up with at least 90% of the shares, they can complete the second step of 
the tender offer with a short-form merger, which does not require a shareholder vote.  However, any tender offer can 
be completed if the bidder receives a voting majority, as defined in the target’s articles of incorporation.  Usually the 
voting majority is defined as either a simple majority or two-thirds majority.  
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are smaller than in mergers, relative to the acquirer. Smaller targets may require less complex 
financing arrangements or none at all.  Third, the acquirer is more likely to choose a merger over 
a tender offer when its debt-to-assets ratio exceeds 0.5.  In sum, the results in Table 1 suggest 
that the choice of method is driven in part by the legal structure and in part by competition for 
the target.   
 
6. Results 
6.1 Time to completion  
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates and robust P-values from OLS regressions of the 
number of days from the announcement of the deal to the effective date of the deal on a tender 
offer dummy and control variables. In column 1, we test the robustness of the correlation 
between tender offers and completion time. The coefficient on the tender dummy is -64.6 days 
and significant at the 1% level. In other words, in this parsimonious test, tenders reach 
completion about 65 days faster than mergers.  
In column 2, we expand the model to include the groups of variables that explain the 
legal & financial constraints on the deal, as well as the competitive environment surrounding the 
deal. The results of the regression in the second column of Table 2 can be summarized as 
follows. First, controlling for all of these other factors, tenders are still about 35 days faster than 
mergers. Second, the legal and financial constraints on the deal do affect the time it takes to get 
the deal done. For instance, our model suggests that cash bids are completed about 29 days faster 
but a second request adds 114 days.  Finally, the competitive environment for the bidder has no 
bearing on the time to completion, controlling for the choice of method.  This result highlights 
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the fact that acquirers choose an acquisition method that is appropriate to the level of 
competition.  
In column 3 of the table, we add industry and year fixed-effects. We observe that the 
economic and statistical significance of the tender offer variable is robust to the inclusion of 
these additional controls.   
 
6.2 Choice of acquisition method  
We presented strong empirical evidence that takeover deals are faster than mergers. The 
main premise of the paper is that the choice of acquisition method is determined by the tradeoff 
of execution speed versus execution cost. Given this fact, we should be able to predict with some 
accuracy whether a deal will be structured as a merger or a tender offer.  
In Table 3, we estimate the probability for a takeover deal to be structured as a tender 
offer. In the first two models, we report the marginal effects from a probit model, while in the 
last two models, we report the coefficient estimates from a linear probability model. The 
explanatory variables include our proxies for competition for the target and costs of waiting 
discussed in Section 3. We also include a number of financial variables for the bidder and target 
as additional controls. The description of the construction of each variable is in Appendix 1. All 
of these values are calculated as of the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the takeover 
announcement.  
Each of the coefficients on the variables describing the level of competition for the target 
have the expected sign and are significant at the 5% level or better. In particular, we find that the 
presence of a competitive bidder increases the probability for a tender offer by around 18 
percent. Bids for targets with a prior relationship with the bidder are also more likely to be 
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structured as tender offers. As noted, losing such firms to a competitor would be more costly to a 
bidder who has made some relationship-specific investments. Finally, we show that solicited bids 
are less likely to take the form of tender offers. Given that solicited bids are initiated by the 
target, they are also less likely to exhibit any strategically important complementarities for the 
bidder.  
Next, we find that the probability for a tender offer decreases with the expected time to 
completion of the tender offer. Deals that receive a second request for information from 
regulators are less likely to be structured as tender offers. As described in Section 3, the 
additional delay caused by such requests effectively eliminates all execution speed benefits of 
tender offers. Acquirers with high debt levels are also less likely to pursue a tender offer, very 
likely due to decreased financing flexibility. Consistent with this idea, we also find that tender 
offers are more likely to be made in cash than mergers.  
We also include in all models financial variables that Kohers et al. (2007) find are 
correlated with the choice of method. As an additional robustness test, we also estimate a linear 
probability-model with and without industry and year fixed effects and get very similar results. 
Our models also explain more than 31 percent of the variation in the choice of acquisition 
method. 
 
6.3 Acquisition premium  
In order to establish a causal relationship from the acquisition method towards the 
acquisition premium, a source of exogenous variation in the choice of method is necessary. 
Throughout the paper, we justify that the competitiveness of the bidder industry and other costs 
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of prolonging the deal would be the main determinants of the acquisition method choice. We also 
present empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture in Table 3.  
In this section, we estimate a two-stage IV-regression model for the acquisition premium. 
If iT  denotes an indicator variable for a tender offer, iINST  – the instruments, iPRM   - the 
acquisition premium, iX  – a set of control variables, and FE  – industry- and year-fixed effects, 
the first-stage regression is: 
FEXINSTT iii   ,      (4) 
while the second-stage regression is: 
FEXTPRM iii 
*** ˆ  ,      (5) 
where iT̂  is the instrumented tender-offer variable at the first stage.  
The two stages are estimated jointly in a two-stage least squares regression model. We 
use as exogenous instruments for the choice of acquisition method the following variables: 
indicators for solicited deals, prior bidder-target relationship, acquirer’s high debt, and second 
information request, as well as the relative value ratio. As shown in Table 3, these variables are 
significant predictors of the tender offer choice. It is also very unlikely that they would predict 
the takeover premium directly (we intentionally exclude the competitive bidder and cash 
variables from the list of instrumental variables since they could be linked to the premium 
through other channels). The dependent variable at the second stage is the takeover premium.   
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates and standard errors from the second stage of the 
two-stage least squares estimation. We find that tender offers are associated with higher 
acquisition premia than mergers. This result supports Hypothesis #3 and thereby lends additional 
support to our theoretical model.  We also find that the premium increases with the size of the 
bidder and decreases with the size of the target. The minimum eigenvalue F-statistics indicate 
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that the instruments are sufficiently powerful according to the Staiger-Stock test (Staiger and 
Stock 1997).18  
 
6.4 Rival reactions  
To test our fourth hypothesis, we present a test for the link between competition and the 
choice of acquisition method. The basic idea is that strategically important acquisitions would be 
perceived as negative news by the bidder’s competitors. Since competitive pressure creates an 
incentive for bidders to move fast and structure their deals as tenders, we would expect to 
observe a negative stock price reaction of the firm’s competitors at the announcement of a tender 
offer. Importantly, we also predict that we will not observe such reactions in the case of mergers.  
In Table 5, we compare announcement-period returns for the acquirer's rivals in mergers 
and tender offers. We use the market-model to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
with a value-weighted index over the windows from [-2,2] and [-1,1] centered around the 
announcement date.  We define rivals as firms in the same four-digit SIC industry with a ratio of 
acquirer assets-to-rival assets in the range from 0.25 to 4.0.   
 Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we observe that both the mean and median stock price 
reactions of bidder competitors are consistently negative in the case of tender offers and 
consistently positive in the case of mergers. The return difference is also statistically and 
economically significant. For example, the first column in Panel A indicates rival returns are 
1.23 percent lower in tender offers than in mergers.  
 
                                                          
18 We obtain similarly significant results if we use a probit in the first stage rather than an OLS model. 
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 7. Conclusion 
Corporate takeovers include some of the largest business transactions in the modern 
economy and have strong consequences for shareholders, employees, and other firm 
stakeholders. Not surprisingly, takeovers have been the subject of active academic research in 
numerous fields – from sociology and labor economics to political science and game theory. 
Almost every facet of the acquisition market has been carefully analyzed by researchers as it 
relates to fundamental questions concerning the boundaries of the firm, the quality of corporate 
governance, and the scope of government regulation.  
Historically, there have been two ways to acquire a publicly traded company – friendly 
and hostile. In the friendly case, the bidding entity submits a proposal to the target board of 
directors which is usually followed by a vote. In the hostile case, the bidder goes directly to the 
target shareholders with an offer to tender their shares at a specified price, hence the name 
“tender offer”. Interestingly, the attitude of tender offers has gradually changed over time – they 
are friendly now – but the form of bidding has not disappeared. Why? The choice of acquisition 
method, while an important decision, remains relatively understudied in the academic literature.  
In this paper, we highlight some important regulatory differences between tender offers 
and mergers, which could affect the acquisition method choice. Given that historically hostile 
tender offers have been viewed as an efficient corporate governance mechanism, government 
regulations were designed to help resolve tender offers quickly and efficiently. Friendly merger 
proposals, on the other hand, are given lower priority. As a result, bidders who prefer fast 
execution (due to bidder competition or other factors) would tend to structure the acquisition as a 
tender offer. However, tender offers also come with a cost because they signal to the target a 
higher value and encourage the target to raise its reservation price. Our theoretical prediction is 
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that, in equilibrium, bidders trade-off the execution speed benefits of tender offers with the lower 
premium benefits of mergers.  
We also present empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions. In 
particular, we show that tender offers are faster but more expensive than mergers. Tender offers 
are also more likely for strategically important acquisitions and acquisitions in more competitive 
environment than mergers.  Finally, we show that rivals suffer lower returns in tender offers than 
mergers.  
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Defininition Source
Four-Week Premium Acquisition premium calculated as the difference between the 
offer price and the stock price four weeks before the 
anouncement date.
CRSP, Eventus
Market-Model Premium Acquisition premium calculated as in Schwert (1996) using the 
market model over the window [-63, min(close, 126)].
CRSP, Eventus
Days to Complete Number of calendar days from the data announced to the 
effective date.
SDC
Relative Value Value of the deal divided by the sum of the value of the deal 
and the market value of the acquirer's assets.
SDC, 
Compustat
Solicited Bid A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target 
creates a formal process to find a buyer for itself.
Edgar
Second Request A dummy variable that takes the value of one if either party 
receives a second request for information from the Department 
of Justice or Federal Trade Commission under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act.
Edgar, Lexis 
Nexis
Competitive Bidder A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer 
had to make a counter-offer or raise its bid to beat another 
bidder.
Edgar
Prior Relationsip A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firms 
disclose prior business dealings in the SEC filings.
Edgar
All Cash Bid A dummy variable that takes the value of one if 100% of the 
consideration offered for the target's shares is cash.
SDC
Deal Value 
(US$, millions)
"Total value of consideration paid by the acquiror, excluding 
fees and expenses," including the value of assumed liabilities.
SDC 
Sales 
(US$, millions)
Sales (SALE) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the acquisition.
Compustat 
Book Assets 
(US$, millions)
Assets (AT) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the acquisition.
Compustat 
Market Value of Assets Debt (DLTT+DLC) plus common stock (PRCCF*CSHO) plus 
preferred stock (PSTKL) minus deferred taxes (TXDC) and 
investment tax credits (ITCI).
Compustat 
Debt/Assets The ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) to the market value of 
assets (see above) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the acquisition.
Compustat
High Debt Dummy A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm's 
Debt/Assets (see above) exceeds 0.5.
Compustat 
EBITDA/Assets Income (OIBDP) divided by the market value of assets (see 
above) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding 
the acquisition.
Compustat 
Market/Book The market value of assets (see above) divided by the book 
value of assets (AT).
Compustat 
Deal outcomes
Deal Characteristics
Firm Characteristics
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Appendix 2: Brief History of the Best Price Rule (SEC Rule 14d-10) 
 
 
The regulatory environment for tender offers has been in flux in the United States for many 
years. In 1986, the SEC adopted Rule 14d-10, otherwise known as the “Best Price Rule.”  This 
regulation specified that, “the consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender 
offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder during such tender offer.”  In 
other words, all investors holding the same class of securities had to be paid the same amount per 
share in a tender offer. The wording of the rule was not clear about whether executive 
compensation triggered by the tender offer was included in the definition of “consideration,” so 
it was left to the courts to decide.  Beginning in 1995, the courts ruled that executive 
compensation contingent on the change-in-control could be part of the consideration paid to the 
executives for their shares.19  From 1995 to 2002, the 2nd, 7th, and 9th U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals made conflicting rulings about the applicability of executive compensation to the 
definition of consideration.  Although tender offers did not disappear during this time, there was 
uncertainty as to whether a buyer might have to go back after completing the deal and pay the 
non-executive target shareholders additional compensation to make them whole.   
The uncertainty about Rule 14d-10 peaked following the resolution of the case of Gerber 
v. Computer Associates International (CA) from the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals.20  In that case, a jury awarded shareholders an additional $5.7 million after finding that 
a $5 million non-compete payment to the CEO was consideration in the tender offer under Rule 
14d-10. Given that CA paid $120 million for the target, the judgment added 4.75% to their costs, 
not including the costs of litigating the case for nearly 11 years.     
                                                          
19 See, for example, Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995) 
20 Gerber vs. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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 The September, 2002 decision in Gerber v. CA in particular made it extremely risky for a 
target firm to make payments to executives that were contingent upon a change in control.  
Based on this ruling, acquiring firms in tender offers were exposed to substantial liability if the 
target firm made payments to any executive via golden parachute, retention agreement, 
accelerated vesting, or consulting agreement, as all could be included as consideration in the 
tender offer.  Motivated by this decision, the SEC chose to clarify that its intention with the best 
price rule was to exclude executive compensation.  As a result, Rule 14d-10 was amended 
effective December 8, 2006 to require that, “the consideration paid to any security holder for 
securities tendered in the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security 
holder for securities tendered in the tender offer.”  In other words, compensation payments are 
excluded from the new version of the best price rule.   
There is anecdotal evidence that the court rulings from 1995 to 2002, and specifically in 
the Gerber v. CA case, skewed the takeover markets away from tender offers until the revision of 
Rule 14d-10 in 2006. In a joint letter submitted to the SEC in 2005 upon its request for 
comments on the proposed changes to the rule, seven top law firms noted that: 
Given the current disarray among courts with respect to the proper interpretation 
of Rule 14d-10 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) — and 
the significant litigation risks entailed in the tender offer process because of these court 
interpretations — most law firms are advising their clients not to commence tender offers 
if other acquisition structures are available that do not have the possible adverse 
consequences of the best-price rule — even if such other structures may be less 
economically efficient for companies and their shareholders.21  
                                                          
21 Letter to the SEC regarding File No: S7-11-05; Release Nos. 34-52968; IC-27193 Amendments to the Tender 
Offer Best-Price Rule (the “Release”), sent February 21, 2006 by Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; Davis Polk & 
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Similar sentiment can be observed in newsletters that law firms sent to their clients after Rule 
14d-10 was revised. For instance, in November, 2006, the law firm Morrison Foerster alerted its 
clients, “We anticipate that with the amendments (to Rule 14d-10) companies will use tender 
offers more frequently...”22 Later, in guidance to clients of the law firm Skadden Arps Slate 
Meagher & Flom, Ward et al. (2011) note that, ”This resurgence (in tender offers) is largely due 
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2006 clarification to the all holders/best price 
rule regarding the treatment of employee compensation in tender offers.” Given that Offenberg 
and Officer (2012) find that most firms now have substantial change-in-control compensation 
contacts, there is reason to believe that acquiring firms were actively avoiding tenders from 2003 
through 2006 so as to avoid the corresponding liability. As a result, there should have been an 
increase in tender offers after 2006.  
 Figure 1 shows the proportion of deals completed by tender offer in the United States 
from 1995 through 2010.  Empirically, the impact of the Gerber decision appears obvious in 
Figure 1. Tender offers represent 14.2% of deals in 2002, but only 3.2% in 2006.  The market for 
tender offers rebounds quickly after 2006, with 20% of deals executed as tenders in 2008 & 
2009.  Any empirical study on the choice of method must account for the legal ambiguity in the 
tender offer rules, particularly from 2002 through 2006.  Given that the tender offer market was 
so skewed by the ambiguous interpretations of Rule 14d-10 and other legal changes, we focus 
our empirical analysis on deals initiated after 2006. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Wardwell; Latham & Watkins, LLP; Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
LLP; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP; and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. 
22 Morrison Foerster Client Alert, “SEC Amends Tender Offer ‘Best Price’ Rule,” 11/6/2006, retrieved from: 
http://www.mofo.com/pubs/xpqPublicationDetail.aspx%3fxpST%3dPubDetail%26pub%3d7260 
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics 
The table reports the average four-week premium, calculated as the difference between the offer price and the stock 
price four weeks before the announcement date; the market model premium, defined as the cumulative abnormal 
return of the target over the window [-63, min(close, 126)]; the number of days to completion; and deal, acquirer, 
and target characteristics across mergers (first column) and tender offers (second column) for the period from 2007 
through 2010. Relative value is the value of the deal divided by the sum of the value of the deal and the market 
value of the acquirer's assets; all cash bid is an indicator variable for 100% cash offers; second request is dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if either party receives a second request for information from the Department of 
Justice or Federal Trade Commission under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act; solicited bid is dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the target creates a formal process to find a buyer for itself; competitive bidder is an indicator for 
deals involving at least two different bidders; prior relationship is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firms 
disclose prior business dealings in the SEC filings; a high debt dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm's debt-to-asset ratio exceeds the industry median. Detailed definition of all variables is outlined in  
Appendix 1. The last column presents the differences of the corresponding characteristics across mergers and tender 
offers. Acquirers in these deals are public firms that held less than 10% of the target before the acquisition and more 
than 90% after. The minimum deal size is US$1 million.  (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.   
Variable Merger Tender Offer
Deal outcomes
Four-Week Premium 44.14% 58.40% 14.26% **
Two-Month Premium 42.69% 58.99% 16.30% ***
Days to Complete 134 58 -76 ***
Deal Characteristics
Relative Value 16.48% 8.86% -7.62% ***
All Cash Bid 42.25% 92.63% 50.38% ***
Second Request 14.49% 2.10% -12.39% ***
Solicited Bid 38.16% 31.58% -6.58%
Competitive Bidder 14.49% 37.89% 23.40% ***
Prior Relationship 8.21% 17.89% 9.68% ***
Deal Value (US$, millions) 2,305 1,079 -1,226 **
Acquirer Characteristics
Sales (US$, millions) 14,994 20,166 5,172 *
Book Assets (US$, millions) 20,843 25,358 4,515
High Debt Dummy 11.27% 2.10% -9.17% ***
EBITDA/Assets 6.27% 10.06% 3.79% ***
Market/Book 136% 158% 22% **
Target Characteristics
Sales (US$, millions) 1,262 399 -863 ***
Book Assets (US$, millions) 2,034 466 -1,568 ***
Debt/Assets 19.22% 11.05% -8.17% ***
EBITDA/Assets 1.60% 0.40% -1.20%
Market/Book 158% 215% 57% ***
Observations 213 95
Difference
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Table 2 
Completion time regressions 
The table reports the coefficient estimates and robust P-values from OLS regressions of the number of days from the 
announcement of the deal to the effective date of the deal on a tender offer dummy; deal relative value; an indicator 
for a cash offer; an indicator for high-debt acquirers (debt-to-asset ratio exceeding the industry median); (log of) 
acquirer and target assets; and indicators for a second request for information on the deal from the Department of 
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, solicited deals, contested offers, and prior relationship between the bidder 
and the target. The sample period is 2007-2010. The last two rows report the total number of observations and 
adjusted R-squared in each regression. Detailed definition of all variables is outlined in Appendix 1. (***), (**), and 
(*) indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Tender Offer dummy -75.6 -35.3 -38.5
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Legal/Financial Impediments to Tenders
Relative Value 61.1 46.7
(0.120) (0.114)
All Cash Bid -33.6 -21.6
(0.000)*** (0.052)*
Acquirer's High Debt dummy -14.7 -21.6
(0.128) (0.362)
Second Request dummy 118.8 115.1
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Competition for Target
Solicited -0.3 -6.5
(0.973) (0.547)
Competitive Bidder dummy 1.2 2.4
(0.861) (0.673)
Prior Relationship dummy 6.1 10.3
(0.407) (0.135)
Financials
Acquirer Ln(Sales) 0.5 -1.5
(0.817) (0.481)
Target Ln(Sales) 2.3 2.2
(0.362) (0.185)
Intercept 133.8 61.9 71.3
(0.000)*** (0.224) (0.021)**
Industry Fixed-Effects No No Yes
Year Fixed-Effects No No Yes
Firms 308 295 295
Adjusted R-squared 0.177 0.468 0.504  
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Table 3 
Choice of method regressions 
The table reports the marginal effects from Probit- and the coefficient estimates from OLS-regressions of the 
probability for a takeover deal to be structured as a tender offer on indicators for solicited deals, contested deals, and 
prior relationship between the acquirer and the target; an indicator for high-debt acquirers (debt-to-asset ratio 
exceeding the industry median); and indicators for a second request for information on the deal from the Department 
of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission; deal relative value; an indicator for cash deals; and additional target 
and acquirer controls. Robust P-values are reported in parentheses. The sample period is 2007-2010. The last two 
rows report the total number of observations and adjusted R-squared in each regression.  (***), (**), and (*) indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Probit Probit OLS OLS
Competition for Target
Solicited -0.198 -0.187 -0.143 -0.134
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.005)*** (0.014)**
Competitive Bidder dummy 0.178 0.168 0.174 0.176
(0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)**
Prior Relationship dummy 0.115 0.117 0.134 0.137
(0.121) (0.064)* (0.087)* (0.083)*
Legal/Financial Impediments to Tenders
Acquirer's High Debt dummy -0.303 -0.3 -0.086 -0.057
(0.006)*** (0.011)** (0.229) (0.491)
Second Request dummy -0.342 -0.306 -0.184 -0.19
(0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)***
Relative Value 0.195 0.144 0.067 0.002
(0.362) (0.252) (0.666) (0.992)
All Cash dummy 0.47 0.451 0.395 0.368
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Financials
Acquirer EBITDA/Assets 1.022 0.798 0.43 0.522
(0.061)* (0.103) (0.002)*** (0.000)***
Acquirer Market/Book 0.069 0.066 0.042 0.042
(0.044)** (0.108) (0.205) (0.234)
Target Ln(Sales) -0.026 -0.014 -0.018 -0.006
(0.137) (0.333) (0.228) (0.712)
Target Debt/Assets 0.248 0.293 0.202 0.195
(0.144) (0.029)** (0.089)* (0.095)*
Target Market/Book 0.038 0.02 0.027 0.011
(0.044)** (0.077)* (0.047)** (0.428)
Constant -0.25 -0.759 0.26 -0.127
(0.435) (0.013)** (0.344) (0.743)
Industry Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 296 296 296 296
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.340 0.403 0.319 0.358
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Table 4 
Takeover premium and acquisition method 
The table estimates a two-stage least squares regression of the effect of the acquisition method on the acquisition 
premium (four-week premium and market model premium). The endogenous variable is an indicator variable for a 
tender offer and is instrumented with dummies for Solicited Bid, Prior Relationship, Acquirer’s High Debt, and 
Second Request, as well as the Relative Value ratio of the deal and target and bidder characteristics. The dependent 
variables at the second stage include the tender offer indicator (instrumented) and the target and bidder 
characteristics. The third and the fourth models also include industry- and year-fixed effects. The table presents 
coefficient estimates and standard errors from the second stage of the two-stage least squares estimation. The sample 
period is 2007-2010. The last three rows report the minimum eigenvalue F-statistic of the instruments at the first 
stage, the root MSE, and the number of observations used in estimation. (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Four-week 
p remium
Two-month 
p remium
Four-week 
p remium
Two-month 
p remium
Tender (Instrumented) 0.288 0.448 0.2 0.275
(0.085)* (0.033)** (0.061)* (0.053)*
Competitive Bidder dummy 0.054 0.13 0.075 0.155
(0.357) (0.044)** (0.082)* (0.000)***
All Cash dummy -0.156 -0.173 -0.139 -0.107
(0.022)** (0.053)* (0.011)** (0.110)
Acquirer Ln(Sales) 0.055 0.038 0.055 0.032
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)***
Acquirer EBITDA/Assets 0.517 0.566 0.735 1.016
(0.213) (0.304) (0.054)* (0.095)*
Acquirer Market/Book 0.009 0.034 0.005 0.035
(0.770) (0.391) (0.816) (0.306)
Target Ln(Sales) -0.076 -0.043 -0.069 -0.03
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)***
Target Debt/Assets 0.418 0.149 0.409 0.113
(0.014)** (0.367) (0.003)*** (0.209)
Target Market/Book -0.048 -0.055 -0.037 -0.037
(0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***
Target EBITDA/Assets -0.066 -0.153 0.014 -0.078
(0.661) (0.128) (0.938) (0.573)
Constant 0.696 0.407 0.294 0.01
(0.060)* (0.047)** (0.421) (0.958)
Industry Fixed-Effects No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 291 288 291 288
F-Stat of instrument @ 1st stage 6.42*** 6.89*** 6.37*** 5.61***  
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Table 5 
Returns to rival firms at acquisition announcements 
The table compares announcement-period returns for the acquirer's rivals in mergers and tender offers in the SDC 
data for the period from 2007 through 2010. The market-model is used to calculate cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) with a value-weighted index over the windows from [-2,2] and [-1,1] centered around the announcement 
date.  Rivals are defined as firms in the same four-digit SIC industry with a ratio of acquirer assets-to-rival assets in 
the range from 0.25 to 4.0.   
 
Deal Type CAR [-2,2] CAR [-1,1] n
Merger 0.63% 0.59% 167
Tender Offer -0.60% -0.12% 70
Difference -1.23% -0.71%
p-value for difference 0.0155 0.0721
Deal Type CAR [-2,2] CAR [-1,1] n
Merger 0.28% 0.21% 167
Tender Offer -0.47% -0.17% 70
Difference -0.75% -0.38%
p-value for difference 0.070 0.070
Panel A: Comparison of Means
Panel B: Comparison of Medians
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Figure 1 Proportion of tender offers by year 
The table reports the total number deals, number of tender offers, and the proportion of tender offers relative to total 
number of deals for publicly-traded targets in the SDC data for each year over the 1995-2010 period.  Acquirers in 
these deals are publicly-traded firms that held less than 10% of the target before the acquisition and more than 90% 
after. The minimum deal size is US$1 million. 
 
